It seems like there are some "mixed messages" out there about what should be in OID 1.2.840.113635.100.8.11.1 in the attestation cert. Is it just a SHA256 hash of the nonce issued by the ACME server? The MDM profile yaml says: "In the attestation certificate the value of the freshness code OID matches the nonce specified by the ACME server via the ACME protocol." I'm hoping the difficulty we're seeing is down to the certificate being created once (and not again for 7 days). Otherwise, we're not decoding/understanding the OID's contents properly. Thanks.

On a supervised device running iOS 18 without any AirDrop restrictions applied, when a profile with allowListedAppBundleIDs restriction key is installed, the AirDrop sound plays. But still the accept prompt does not appear, making it impossible to accept files. The prompt works as expected on iOS 18 devices to which the allowListedAppBundleIDs restriction is not installed. This issue occurs only on supervised iOS 18 devices to which the allowListedAppBundleIDs restriction is being applied. Device must be in iOS 18 version > Install the (allowListedAppBundleIDs restriction) profile with the device > Try to AirDrop files to the managed device. The expected result is that the accept prompt must pop up but it does not appear. This issue is occurring irrespective of any Whitelisted bundle ID being added to the allowListedAppBundleIDs restriction profile. Have attached a few Whitelisted bundle ID here com.talentlms.talentlms.ios.beta, com.maxaccel.safetrack, com.manageengine.mdm.iosagent, com.apple.weather, com.apple.mobilenotes, gov.dot.phmsa.erg2, com.apple.calculator, com.manageengine.mdm.iosagent, com.apple.webapp, com.apple.CoreCDPUI.localSecretPrompt etc. Have raised a Feedback request (FB15709399) with sysdiagnose logs and a short video on the issue.

I’m working on a product that includes TLS inspection capability. TLS inspection using a local MitM requires installing a trusted root certificate which is then used to create masquerade certificates to intercept and forward TLS traffic through the proxy. For manual installation the end user is required to authenticate as an administrator to modify the trust settings on our internal CA’s root certificate. My question concerns the options for enterprise deployment using an MDM. We want the generated root certificate to be unique to each endpoint so that if a private key is compromised it can’t be used to intercept traffic anywhere else. We can install a “certificate trust” configuration profile from the MDM but this requires a base64 encoded string of the root certificate. In effect the MDM needs to obtain the certificate from the endpoint and then send it back in the form of a configuration profile. I’m not aware that MDMs like Jamf can be configured to do this directly so we’re looking for any other mechanism to have macOS trust a locally generated certificate via MDM based on some non endpoint-unique criteria? One option might be to use an external CA with a trusted certificate to sign an intermediate endpoint certificate but this creates a significant risk if the external trusted certificate were ever compromised. Is this a common industry practice? So my question remains is there a better way to trust our per endpoint root certificate via MDM without needing to install a unique per endpoint configuration profile?